Abstract: This paper provides detailed information on banking structure, permissible banking activities, regulatory structure, deposit insurance schemes, and supervisory practices in each of the 15 European Union countries, as well as in Canada, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States. Comparisons across the countries show there is a wide range of banking structures and supervisory practices, and there is a roughly equal division between those countries that rely on the central bank as the chief banking supervisor and those that do not. In addition, although all of the countries currently have deposit insurance schemes, these schemes differ widely in many respects. Cross-country comparisons of the different aspects of banking do reveal one common characteristic, however. Almost all of the countries allow a wide range of banking activities, including underwriting, dealing, and brokering in both securities and insurance, and these activities can generally be conducted either directly in a bank or indirectly through a subsidiary of a bank, rather than through a holding company structure. The notable exceptions to this common tendency are the United States and Japan. An appendix presents an exploratory regression analysis illustrating a way in which empirical examinations of bank performance might be enriched by taking into account differences in permissible banking activities across countries.
I. Introduction
The United States and many other countries have experi enced serious banking difficulties during the past 15 years. In the case of the U.S., not since the 1930s have so many bankin g institutions failed and cost so much to resolve. In several other parts of the world, the situation 1 has been no better, if not actually worse. Indeed, the relative costs of resolving banking problems have been particularly high in such countries as Finland, Norway, Spain and Sweden compared to the U.S. At least for these particular countries the immediate crises are past. But for stil l 2 others, like Brazil, Japan, Mexico, and Russia, banking problems have yet to be fully resolved. 3 This troublesome situation for banks in several parts of the world has been attributed to "... a mixture of bad luck, bad policies ... and bad banking." More specifically, "... in addition to the volatility of the environment, an increase in bankers' inclinations a nd incentives to take risk For information on these laws and regulations, see Spong (1994) . 4 2 explains why banking no longer appears to be so safe" (see Caprio and Klingebiel (1996, pp. 2, 22) ). Differences in the range of activities in which banks have been permitted to engage i n different countries has not been found to be a cause of these banking problems. The problems, in any event, have elicited responses from the legislative and regulatory authorities in man y countries. In the U.S., the response of t he authorities was to implement a series of new laws and regulations during the past 15 years in an attempt to promote greater confidence and stability in the banking industry. 4 The banking authorities in some of the other countries grappling with banking problems followed a similar strategy: new laws and regulations were implemented over the same tim e period to resolve existing banking problems and to l essen the likelihood of future problems. The laws and regulations that were implemented generally were designed to ensure that bank s operate in a "safe and sound" manner. In this regard, new bank standards for capitalization, risk exposure, and information disclosure were established. In addition, modifications were made in the restrictions on the pricing of bank products; the allowable activities of banks; the extent to which banks could be owned by, and be owners of, nonbank firms; the restrictions o n geographical expansion of banks through branching, merger and acquisition; the supervisor y practices to contain bank risk-taking behavior; and the insurance or guarantee schemes to protect depositors from bank failures. The exact mix of laws and regulations implemented in individual countries reflected varying economic, political, and social considerations.
Importantly, the laws and regulations implemented in recent years were not always the result of independent actions taken by individual countries. Instead, many of the new laws and
The EU was officially created in November 1993 with the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty.
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Prior to the treaty, the EU was known as the European Community (EC). For information on the origins and growth of the EU and EC, see Borchardt (1995) and Fontaine (1995) . The BIS was founded in 1930 and is headquartered in Basle. Although it has 32 members, the board of directors of the BIS is made up of central bank representatives of the G-10 countries.
It is reported that some believe the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) should combine 6 with the EU and perhaps the post-communist countries to formally agree on free trade among themselves, creating the Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) (see Brimelow (1996) ). Furthermore, in an address by Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, at the Group of Seven (G-7) summit in Lyons on June 24, 1996, it was stated that "The dissemination of a clear set of internationally accepted standards could provide the basis for the regulation and supervision of banking systems around the world." And "...that the IMF, because of its legitimacy and universal responsibility for surveillance, has a role to play in facilitating this globalization of standards for bank supervision developed in Basle and put in practice in the G-10 countries (see International Monetary Fund (1996a, p. 236) ). [For a discussion of the role of the IMF as a potential international lender of last resort, see Barth and Keleher (1984) ]. Lastly, Noia (1995, p. 30) states that "The problems of coordinating different countries' DIAs [Deposit Insurance Agencies] are so big that they could be solved in various ways"...including... "the creation of a European DIA"...which... "could be something like a regional agency for Europe of an international deposit insurance corporation...." Whether the particular bank regulations now in existence in various countries ar e sufficient to accomplish the goal of greater conf idence and stability in banking so as to minimize any adverse effects on real economic activity is a complicated issue. Banks engage in a variety of activities typically funded with insured deposits and subject to a variety of supervisor y
In the context discussed here, "moral hazard" refers to the incentive for individuals or firms to engage 7 in riskier activities when they are insured against adverse outcomes than otherwise, while "adverse selection" refers to the incentive for individuals or firms more at risk to adverse outcomes to seek insurance against such outcomes. Access to insured deposits by banks and limited liability protection to their shareholders give rise to these potential moral hazard and adverse selection problems.
Some argue that there are other and more desirable ways than deposit insurance and constraining 8 regulations to prevent serious and widespread banking problems from arising. See, for example, the discussion of narrow banking in Litan (1987) and Phillips (1995). 4 practices that affect their behavior. Deposit insurance or deposit guarantee schemes an d supervisory oversight exist in all the industrial countries. Indeed, following the recent banking problems in different parts of the world, many countries previously without explicit deposi t insurance schemes have recently established them. As these schemes become even mor e widespread, the potential for moral hazard and adverse selection problems is always present.
7
Keeping such potential problems in check requires an appropriate combination of regulations , examinations, and supervisory actions to contain bank risk-taking behavior. If this is not done, the insurer and society will be inadequately protected from excessively c ostly and disruptive bank failures. At the same time, however, the overall regulatory, examination, and supervisor y environment in which banks operate must not be so constraining as to prevent institutions from pursuing prudent and profitable opportunities, or so burdensome as to impose unnecessary costs on institutions. Otherwise, banks will be handicapped in competing in a rapidly changing and fiercely competitive global financial marketplace with less regulated firms able to supply both traditional and newer financial services in a more timely and efficient manner.
8
The purpose of this paper is to provide information that may be useful in bette r understanding and addressing these important and controversial issues by examining th e structure, regulation, and performance of banks from an international perspective. The structure
There is overlap between these two groups. Countries in both the EU and the G-10: Belgium, France, 9
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Countries in the EU only: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Luxembourg. Countries in the G-10 only: Canada, Japan, Switzerland, and the U.S. Since 1984 the G-10 has included 11 countries.
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of banking in the EU and G-10 countries is compared and contrasted, in order to identif y significant similarities and differences in the structure of banking in the 19 separate countrie s composing these two groups. The regulatory, supervisory, and deposit insurance environment 9 in which banks operate in each of these countries is also compared and contrasted, enabling one to identify significant similarities and differences in the regulatory environment that may hel p explain the structure of banking in the various countries. Beyond this detailed comparison, the effect of the overall structural and regulatory environment on individual bank performance i s investigated in order to evaluate the appropriateness of existing regulation s in individual countries and any proposals for reforming them. More specifically, an exploratory empirical analysi s based upon a sample of banks in the different countries is conducted to assess the effect of the different "regulatory regimes" on the performance of individual banks, controlling for variou s bank-specific and country-specific factors that may also affect bank performance. In this way, the paper attempts to contribute to an assessment of the appropriate balance between market and regulatory discipline that would ensure that banks have sufficient opportunities to compet e prudently and profitably in a global financial marketplace. By presenting such an assessment, the paper provides information as to whether the U.S. is "out-of-step " with banking developments in other industrial countries.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, banking industr y structure in the EU and G-10 countries is compared and contrasted. Section III compares th e 6 permissible activities, ownership opportunities, geographical expansion possibilities, an d corporate organizational form of banks in the different countries. In section IV the depositinsurance schemes in all 19 countries are compared and contrasted. This is followed by a documentation of differences and similarities in supervisory practices and capital standards i n section V. Section VI discusses a few issues that merit further consideration, while section VII contains the summary and conclusions. Based upon information derived fro m these comparisons, Appendix 1 presents an exploratory regression analysis illustrating that empirical examinations of bank performance might be enriched by taking into account the reg ulatory regime under which each bank operates, as well as bank-specific and country-specific factors.
II. Banking Industry Structure
One of the motivations for this paper is to understand better international differences in banking industry structure and regulation. As Baer and Mote (1985, p.1) stated more than a decade ago, "... systematic inter-country comparisons of structure and performance..." are "... of interest in their own right..." and "... offer the possibility of measuring the effects o f regulation...." In the U.S., for example, banks face constraints on the extent to which they may engage in various security and insurance activities. It would be useful to know whether banks in other countries are granted greater freedom to engage in these activities. Furthermore, on e may be able to use such information in an inter-country comparison of bank performance t o assess the appropriateness of relaxing U.S. constraints in these specific areas. As a first step in Using some of this data for the EU and G-10 countries, Appendix 1 presents an exploratory empirical 10 analysis of the impact of bank structure, regulation, supervision, and the macroeconomic environment on the performance of individual banks in the different countries.
World banking assets are calculated by totaling all asset-side items under the category "Deposit
11
Money Banks" for every country included in International Monetary Fund (1996b). The banking assets for each of the 19 countries are calculated in a similar manner.
In this regard, our paper follows the earlier work of Borio and Filosa (1994) , who examine many of 12 the same issues. Other related and informative material is found in Barfield (1996) , Barth and Bartholomew (1992) , Dermine (1990) , Fingleton and Schoemmaker (1992) , Herring and Litan (1995) , Hoschka (1993) , Klein (1995) , Mayer and Vives (1993) , Mullineux (1992) , Carmoy (1990) , Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (1992) and (1995b) , Reincke (1995) , Stone and Zissu (1994) , and U.S. General Accounting Office (1994).
7 that direction, it is important to compare and contrast the role of banks and the structure of the banking industry in different countries.
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The specific countries chosen for the comparative examination are the EU and G-1 0
countries. As Table 1 shows, the 19 countries belonging to either of these two groups account for a relatively small percent of the world's population, but a large percent of both the world's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and banking assets. Indeed, these countries account for 79 11 percent of the world's GDP and 86 percent of the world's banking assets. By selecting thes e particular countries for a comparative analysis of bank structure, regulation, and performance one may identify some "stylized facts" that any truly general theoretical banking model ought to seek to explain. Furthermore, the U.S. and the EU are frequently comp ared because they are roughly 12 equal in terms of shares of both population and GDP. Yet, despite those similarities, the E U accounts for a significantly larger share of the world's banking assets than the U.S. Whether a country has a bank-based or stock market-based financial system is important.
Each type of system facilitates the flow of funds from savers to borrowers, but each has different implications for dealing with potential asymmetric informati on problems that arise between those providing the funds and those receiving them. In particular, borrowers typically have bette r information about their own riskiness than savers do. Savers must therefore distinguish goo d from bad risks. They must also monitor borrower s once funds have been provided to be sure the funds are being used as intended. Is the ideal financial system in terms of linking savers an d borrowers one which relies heavily on banks through lending and stock ownership or control to
For a discussion of these issues, see Allen (1993) , Gilson (1995), and Prowse (1994) . Of course, both 14 types of financial systems simultaneously contain banks and stock markets (or, more generally, capital markets). There may therefore be a tendency to converge to a more uniform financial system to the extent stock-market type countries grant banks broader corporate control powers and bank-market type countries take actions that foster freer development of the capital markets. In this regard, Macey and Miller (1995, p. 112) state that "...while the degree of banks' influence in Germany ... is probably excessive, the level of banks' influence in the United States is likely too low."
The focus of this paper is on commercial banks. However, it is clear that over time it is becoming 15 ever more difficult to maintain distinctions among the different types of financial service firms. Indeed, in some of the countries regulations refer only to credit institutions, recognizing that the distinctions between commercial banks and other credit institutions are no longer important for regulatory purposes. To the extent possible, however, the paper is based upon an examination of the structure, regulation and performance of commercial banks. This facilitates comparisons between developments in the U.S., where commercial banks are still subject to different regulatory treatment than other financial service firms (including other depository institutions), and in other industrial countries. Tables A.2.b and A.2.c present some limited quantitative information on the role of commercial banks compared to other financial service firms in the U.S. As may be seen from these two appendices, the traditional role of commercial banks compared to nondepository financial service firms has declined over time, but nonetheless they remain the most important type of depository institution in terms of total assets. For more information and discussion of these and related trends in U.S. banking, see Berger, Kashyap and Scalise (1995), French (1994) , Nolle (1995a), and Rhoades (1996) .
To obtain a comparative perspective at different points in time, see Baltensperger and Dermine (1990) 16 for related data for 1986 (as well as a discussion of many of the same issues addressed in this paper). The figure for Germany, however, increases more than threefold when one includes saving and 18 cooperative banks. For the U.S., the figure increases to 0.83 when one includes savings banks, savings and loans, and credit unions. 11 geographic areas. In addition, the elimination of excess capacity in the global banking industry is being accomplished through greater consolidation, mainly through mergers and acquisitions. Table 3 also presents information on the extent to which deposits are the funding source for assets, and loans the primary balance-sheet asset of banks. In regard to these traditional 17 banking activities, U.S. banks fund a larger share of their assets with deposits (74 percent) than banks in both the G-10 (61 percent) and the EU (51 percent). Loans account for 58 percent of assets for U.S. banks, whereas the corresponding figures are 62 percent and 53 percent for the EU and G-10 banks, respectively.
The figures in Table 3 , moreover, show that banking markets in most of the examine d countries are relatively concentrated. The largest three banks account for more than 50 percent of total bank assets in 12 of the 19 countries. The U.S. has the lowest degree of concentration 13 percent. Information is also presented on the bank share of the total assets of all credi t institutions (i.e., basically all depository institutions). These figures vary quite widely across the countries, reflecting differences in the extent to which banks are still considered and treated as a separate and distinct segment of all credit institutions. importance of different sources of funding for business firms across countries and thereby th e alternative ways in which potential informational and monitoring problems are resolved.
The information presented in Tables 1, 2 , and 3 clearly shows there are substantia l differences in the role of banks and the structure of banking industry across the EU and G-1 0 countries.
III. Permissible Activities, Ownership Opportunities, and Geographical Possibilities
An important factor in an examination of the performance of banks is the type and extent of activities in which they are permitted to engage. By restricting the typ e and extent of activities, laws and regulations limit the opportunity of banks, if not their shareholders, to select fro m various return and risk portfolios available in the marketplace. Banks may be restricted to a relatively narrow range of activit ies, mainly lending and deposit-taking activities, and prevented from owning or being owned by nonbanks. Alternat ively, they may be permitted relatively wide latitude to engage in other activities, including various securities, insurance, and real estat e activities, and to own or be owned by nonbanks. Table 4 provides detailed information about the permissible securities, insurance and real estate activities of banks in each of the EU and the G-10 countries, and Table 5 summarizes the information in Table 4 to provide a more general comparison. There is not a uniform regulatory structure with respect to these particular activiti es, although there are common tendencies among most countries. In 14 countries securities activities are unrestricted, in 3 countries they ar e Securities activities include underwriting, dealing and brokering all kinds of securities and all aspects 19 of the mutual fund business. Insurance activities include underwriting and selling insurance products/services as principal and as agent. Real estate activities include investment, development and management. Unrestricted means that a full range of activities in the given category can be conducted directly in the bank. Permitted means that a full range of activities can be conducted, but all or some must be conducted in subsidiaries. Restricted means that less than a full range of activities can be conducted in the bank or subsidiaries. Prohibited means that the activity cannot be conducted in either the bank or subsidiaries.
See, for example, Bisignano (1992) for a discussion of this categorization of countries based upon the 20 existence of universal banks, among other related issues. It should be noted in this regard that Saunders and Walter (1994, p. 234) emphasize that "...no country in the developed world has a fully integrated universal banking system." They add that "The closest example is Germany...". For further discussion of this particular issue as well as an assessment of the pros and cons of universal banking systems, see their recent and comprehensive book on this subject. countries, restricted in 4 countries, and prohibited in 2 countries. Real estate activities ar e unrestricted in 5 countries, permitted in 6 countries, and restricted in 8 countries. Overall, real estate is the most restricted of the three activities.
The information in Tables 4 and 5 shows that the U.S. is "out-of-step" with the majority of the other countries in terms of providing banks with the opportunity to engage in securities, insurance, and real estate activities. In most other countries, banks may not only engage in a full range of securities and insurance activities, but do so directly in the bank and without mandated firewalls (i.e., restrictions designed to maintain securities and insurance activities separate from affiliated banks) (also see Tables 6a and 6b ). This overall relatively limited regulator y intervention reflects, in part, actions recently taken within the EU to provide flexibility to al l member countries to establish universal banking systems. To differing degrees, such system s have existed for some time in France, Italy, the Netherlands, and most notably, Germany .
Switzerland should be added to this group, although it is not a member-country of the EU. As 20
Canadian law imposes branching restrictions on foreign-owned banks, however, and EU members 21 may also treat foreign branches differently than branches of domestic banks. In Canada, moreover, "Under existing rules, no single shareholder may hold more than 10 percent of a Schedule I institution, which includes the six biggest domestic banks. The curb was put in place in the mid-1960s to thwart New York based Chase Manhattan's plans to buy Toronto Dominion" (Simon, p. 20). Some Canadian bankers now believe this ownership restriction impedes the consolidation of the banking industry necessary "to compete not only with U.S. banks, but with non-bank financial groups, such as Fidelity Investments and GE Capital, which have significantly expanded in Canada in recent years" (Simon, p. 20).
14 a result of the recent actions taken in the EU, the divergence in the activities in which EU banks and U.S. banks are able to engage should widen still further over time, unless correspondin g actions are taken in the U.S. Table 4 also presents information about the extent to which banks are permitted to invest in nonfinancial firms and vice versa. In 11 countries, banks are unrestricted with respect t o investing in nonfinancial firms. This type of investment is permitted in 2 countries and restricted in 6 countries. On the other hand, nonfi nancial firms have wide access to bank ownership in 13 of the countries, with the remaining 6 countries imposing restrictions on such ownership. Once again, U.S. banks find themselves operating under the most restrictive regulatory regime wit h respect to ownership opportunities. This disparity raises the question of whether the atypica l situation in the U.S. permits funds to flow appropriately from savers to borrowers withou t impeding risk-sharing opportunities and the efficient allocation of resources. countries authorize the activities. The directive thereby establishes the principle of mutua l recognition, which means that each banking authority in the separate member countries i s responsible for regulating and supervising its own chartered or licensed banks, both domestically and throughout the EU. Table 7 provides the agreed-upon list of the approved activities that are considered to be the core activities of banks in the EU. Each member country must decide which of the activities will be authorized for its own banks. Universal banks, such as those in Germany, are typically permitted to engage in all of the activities on the list. However, such banks also typically engage in insurance and real estate activities, which are not included on the list of approved activities.
Whether banks are permitted to engage in these activities is determined by home and host country regulations. Every authorized credit institution in each of the EU countries is covered by th e directive, where such an institution is defined "as an undertaking whose business is to receiv e deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account." As a result, "financial institutions such as investment firms, investment funds and insuranc e companies do not fall within its scope" (Benink (1993, p.55) General Accounting Office (1995, p. 20) and Fein (1993) ). Recently, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System proposed raising the limit on bank-ineligible securities to 25 percent of a Section 20 subsidiary's gross revenue (see, for example, Taylor and Frank (1996) ).
According to Kane (1996, p. 141 Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA) that the web of federal statutes has begun to slot into line with the economic realities of bank geographic and product-line expansion." Interestingly, federally chartered savings and loans are permitted to branch both interstate and intrastate free from any restrictions imposed by state laws.
Despite the restrictions on commercial banks in the U.S., unitary savings and loan holding companies 27 may be commercial firms, and their non-savings and loan subsidiaries may engage in unlimited securities and insurance activities. For this and other reasons the savings and loan holding company law is more flexible than the Bank Holding Company Act (see Downey (1996) ). There is no documented evidence, moreover, that this greater charter flexibility contributed to the savings and loan debacle in the 1980s (see Barth (1991) Tables 9a and 9b ). Yet, despite these recent and important developments, the U.S. still remains 26 more restrictive in regulating banks in these and other areas when compared to most othe r countries in the EU and G-10. This raises the question of whether the U.S. or these othe r countries have achieved the most appropriate balance between market and regulatory discipline to constrain both the kind and the extent of risky activities in which banks engage.
In view of debate in the U.S. over the most appropriate way to regulate the corporat e structure of banks, it is interesting to note that in many of the G-10 and EU countries banks can engage in a wide range of activities directly in the bank, or through subsidiaries of the bank , rather than through a holding company. Tables 6a and 6b present information on whether bank   27 holding companies are permitted or not, and on the permissible corporate organizational form in which to conduct securities, insurance, and real estate activities in selected EU and G-1 0 18 countries. In 11 of the 15 countries surveyed, bank holding companies are permitted, including the U.S. However, in 8 of these countries bank holding companies are infrequently used , although they are permitted. Only in 3 countries (Italy, the Netherlands, and the U.S.) are bank holding companies permitted and widely used. In the other 12 countries they are either no t permitted or not frequently used.
With respect to permissible corporate organizational form in which to conduct securities activities, in all 14 countries (omitting the U.S. for the mo ment) such activities may be conducted in a bank subsidiary. In 13 countries they may be conducted in the bank itself (Canada being the only exception). Furthermore, even though securities activities may be conducted in nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies in 7 of these countries, in all but possibly one country they are most frequently conducted either in a bank or a bank subsidiary.
With respect to permissible corporate organizational form in which to conduct insurance activities, in 13 countries (again omitting the U.S. for the moment) such activities may b e conducted in a bank subsidiary. In 6 countries they may be conducted in the bank itself .
Furthermore, in 8 of the 14 countries insurance activities may be conducted in nonban k subsidiaries of bank holding compani es; yet, in only 2 of the 8 countries are such activities most frequently conducted through these nonbank subsidiaries.
With respect to permissible corporate form in which to conduct real estate activities, in 12 countries (once again omitting the U.S.) such activities may be conducted in a ban k subsidiary. In 7 countries they may be conducted in the bank itself. In 6 of the 14 countries real estate activities may be conducted in nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies, but i n only one country are such activities most frequently conducted in this manner. organization for banks to engage in securities, insurance and real estate activities in the U.S. are so numerous and complex that it is difficult to summarize such practices in Table 6a . Second, U.S. banks are restricted to a narrower range of permissible activities t han are banks in most G-10 and EU countries. Finally, unlike the other countries surveyed, U.S. banks are very restricted in their ability to engage in securities, insurance and real estate activities directly in the bank, or a subsidiary of the bank. More commonly, U.S. banking law requires banks to use a subsidiary of a bank holding company, not a subsidiary of the bank itself, for these activities.
The clear pattern that emerges from the information presented in Tables 6a and 6b is that the U.S. is "out-of-step" with most of the other countries with respect to permissible corporate organizational form in which to conduct securities, insurance, and real estate activities. In 13 of the 14 countries surveyed (omitting the U.S.), securities activities are most frequently conducted in either a bank or a bank subsi diary. In 12 of these countries, insurance activities are also most frequently conducted in either a bank or a bank subsidiary. In 11 of the 14 countries, real estate activities are most frequently conducted in either a bank or a bank subsidiary. When given a choice, banks in most countries appear to favor the less complex corporate organizational form in which to conduct these particular activities.
28 regulatory constraint rather than based on any inherent advantages to the bank holding company structure. This development may enable national banks, for example, to engage in securities activities more 32 efficiently through operating subsidiaries rather than through a securities subsidiary of a bank holding company, which also has a separate national bank subsidiary.
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In view of this situation, the OCC in November 1996 issued a rule revising its regulations governing corporate activities by national banks. In general, the rule permits national banks to 31 seek OCC permission, on a case-by-case basis, to conduct activities not permissible for the bank itself through operating subsidiaries. In this way, effective January 1, 1997, banks have been provided with the potential to engage in a wider range of activities "that are part of or incidental to the business of banking."
32

IV. Deposit Insurance Schemes
It is currently common for banks to accept deposits that are payable on demand at pa r value on a first-come, first-serve basis. These deposit s are then used to fund illiquid loans whose values typically are difficult to assess by depositors as compared to bankers, which gives rise to an "asymmetry of information" problem. As a result of these differences in the two sides of the balance sheet and in available information, banks are subject to runs whenever depositors believe the value of bank assets is insufficient to fulfill the bank's obligations to them, even whe n bankers know otherwise. If runs do occur and are widespread, banks could be forced to sel l illiquid assets at "fire-sale" prices and thereby be driven into insolvency. An illiquidity problem, in other words, could be transformed into an insolvency problem. Such an event could result in severe disruptions in both the payments and credit systems, with adverse affects on the rea l For further discussion of these issues, see Barth and Brumbaugh (1994a) and (1994b) throughout the banking industry. Another way is to establish a deposit insurance scheme i n which depositors are protected against the loss of their deposits. In this latter case, whe n depositors are protected from losses, any incentive for a run on banks is eliminated. However, once a country decides to establish a deposit insurance scheme, the way in which that an d associated regulatory-supervisory schemes are structured affects both the likelihood of mora l hazard and adverse selection problems arising and the degree of severity should those problems arise.
33 Table 10 presents information on the structure of the deposit insurance schemes that have been established in each of the EU and G-10 countries. When comparing these schemes, it is 34 important to note that a minimum level of harmonization exists among the EU countries due to the Directive on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes adopted on May 30, 1994. This directive requires that all member countries ensure that at least one deposit-insurance scheme be established and officially recognized as of July 1, 1995. Each of the schemes must at the very least provide a A scheme that incorporates a coinsurance provision is compatible with this requirement because the 35 guarantee may be limited to a specified percentage of deposits. The percentage guaranteed, however, must be equal to or exceed 90 percent of aggregate deposits until the amount to be paid reaches 20,000 ECU (see Raworth (1995, p.99) ).
According to Commerzbank (1994, p. 62) , "Originally, an upper limit was envisaged for deposit 36 insurance in order to preclude cross-border competition in this area." 23 uniform minimum amount of coverage to protect depositors. If a country has a scheme 35, 36 providing depositor coverage that exceeds the minimum amount, then branches of bank s belonging to schemes in other countries with less coverage may obtain the extra coverage b y joining the host country insurance scheme. For most other aspects of the insurance schemes that are established in the EU, decisions are left to the discretion of the individual member countries.
Overall, the directive expands the pool of depositors in the EU explicitly protected against losses from bank insolvencies.
The deposit insurance schemes in exi stence do indeed vary from one country to the next.
Several salient differences in the schemes may be noted based upon the information in Table 10 .
The earliest deposit-insurance scheme established among the 19 countries was in 1933 in th e U.S., while the most recent scheme was established in 1995 in Greece. Over half of the depositinsurance schemes were established within the past two decades. Of course, in many of thes e countries an implicit if not explicit scheme was undoubtedly in place.
As may be seen in Table 10 , in 7 countries the insur ance schemes are administered by the government, in 7 countries the schemes are administered by the banking industry, and in th e remaining 5 countries the schemes are administered jointly by government and industry. Most (16) of the countries, moreover, make it compulsory that banks join the insurance scheme .
Perhaps most importantly, these countries differ with respect to whether funding is provided ex
The lack of a pre-specified plan to handle catastrophic losses was an issue raised in the massive losses 37 incurred by savings and loans in the 1980s and the early 1990s in the U.S. (see Barth (1991) ).
Actually, in the U.S. an individual may have an individual account, a joint account, a revocable trust 38 account, and IRA and Keogh accounts, each of which is separately insured up to $100,000 at the same bank. Additional insurance may be obtained by placing deposits in multiple banks.
24 ante (i.e., a reserve fund is established before bank failure losses occur), or ex post (i.e., funds are obtained after bank failure losses occur). In 13 countries the scheme is funded ex ante , whereas in 6 countries the funding is ex post. No country appears to make explicit the source of funding for catastrophic losses resulting from bank failures that overwhelm the reserve fund or the ability of participating banks to cover the losses. In the case of ex ante funding schemes, 37 only 3 countries specify a minimum reserve level for the fund. Only Portugal, Sweden and the U.S., moreover, specify risk-based deposit-insurance premiums. Table 12 , which summarizes some of the information in Tabl es 10 and 11, shows that the amount of coverage per depositor for the ex ante schemes ranges from a low of 12,030 USD in
Spain to a high of 491,129 USD in Italy. In the U.S., the comparable figure is 100,000 USD , placing it third in terms of coverage among the countries examined, excluding Finland an d
Germany. When one compares the amount of coverage per depositor to per capita GNP, one 38 finds that in only four countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain and Switzerland) is the coverage amount less than per capita income. In the case of Germany, each depositor of a bank is insured for up to 30 percent of the capital at the time of the last published annual accounts of that bank, although all payments end once the insurance fund is depleted. Interestingly, Roth (1994, p. 44) states that "This unique scheme implies that the coverage will decline as the level of capita l decreases." He adds that "This could be an incentive for depositors to withdraw funds from a
Italy and Portugal have schemes in which depositors are fully protected up to specified maximum 39 amounts and then are partially protected for additional specified amounts, thereby incorporating a coinsurance element.
25
suspect bank" (p. 44). In the case of Finland, each depositor of a bank is insured in full. The
United Kingdom and Ireland are the only countries that have made coinsurance a part of th e deposit-insurance scheme, whereby deposi tors share in any losses resulting from bank failures.
39
Over the last 50 years in Switzerland no public funds have been used to prevent the insolvency of a privately owned bank, and no statutory deposit insurance scheme has been implemented .
Switzerland, however, does provide for preferential rights to individuals with savings deposits (up to 10,000 S.F. per depositor) when resolving an insolvent bank.
Existing differences in the deposit insurance schemes in these countries may result i n individuals choosing physically distant banking relationships. Individuals may, with th e liberalization of capital flows across national borders, choose banks otherwise offering essentially the same services on the basis of deposit-insurance protection. This may especially be the case in an increasingly global banking market when both nonresident depositors are covered an d
foreign-currency-denominated deposits are covered by such schemes (see Table 10 ) .
Furthermore, the differences in the deposit-insurance schemes may result in foreign branche s obtaining insurance coverage in a country even though that country has no authority to regulate the risk-taking behavior of those branches because of mutual recognition. In this regard , Baltensperger and Dermine (1990, p. 33) state that "As long as national authorities do no t delegate their powers to a supranational authority, we recommend that they keep ful l responsibility for domestic markets. This is justified because a bank failure will affect the local economy, the deposit insurance system or the lender of last resort. Supervision should not b e
Beyond the immediate costs of resolving bank failures, of course, there are the societal costs of both a 40 misallocation of investment resources and a redistribution of wealth.
Recognizing the importance of the double-edge aspect to bank regulation early on, Buser, Chen and 41 Kane (1981) develop a model taking into account the "joint responses of regulator and regulatee" (p. 53). Also, given the specific focus of this paper, it should be mentioned that recently Santomero and Trester (1993) develop a model "...to determine qualitative characteristics of an optimal regulatory strategy" (p. 4) which "...highlights...the need for international harmonization of policy...in a unified European banking system" (p. 5).
26 entirely delegated to the supervisor of the parent bank." It has also been argued that the fact that, for example, "German banks will not be allowed to offer their own more generous level o f protection elsewhere within the EU" . . . "would seem to be at odds with the principle of homestate regulation; it also impedes competition" (see Commerzbank (1994, p. 62) ).
V. Supervisory Practices and Capital Standards
The degree to which particular supervisory practices and capital standards are suitable for addressing banking risk is a complex issue, depending upon the s tructure of the deposit insurance scheme as well as the permissible activities, ownership opportunities, and geographica l possibilities of banks. Nevertheless, t here can be no doubt that supervisory practices and capital standards, like regulatory constraints and deposit insurance schemes, affect the performance of According to Giddy (1994, p. 14) , "In an ideal world, the bank supervisory agency would be separate It is for this reason that a comparison of supervisory practices and capital standards, in addition to regulatory constraints and deposit-insurance schemes, is important. balance sheet items to broad risk categories is specified to enable the calculation of a risk-based capital ratio. A minimum ratio of total capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2) to risk-weighted assets of 8 percent (of which at least 4 percent should be in the form of core capital) was specified by yearend 1992.
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In the case of the EU, two primary directives addressing capital standards were adopted: Table 13 ). These are as follows: (1) well-capitalized; (2) adequately capitalized; (3 ) undercapitalized; (4) significantly undercapitalized; and (5) (See Gilbert (1992, p. 20) ). Furthermore, Alice M. Rivlin, Vice Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, states that "Supervisory sanctions under Prompt Corrective Action were to be based on the bank's risk performance as measured by its levels of regulatory capital, in particular its leverage ratio and total risk-based capital ratio under the Basle capital standards." Yet, "These standards now seem well-intended but rather outdated." The reason, according to Vice Chair Rivlin, is that "the scope and complexity of banking activities has proceeded apace during the last two decades or so, and standard capital measures, at least for our very largest and most complex organizations, are no longer adequate measures on which to base supervisory action...." In addition, "Research shows that CAMEL ratings are much better predictors of bank insolvency than 'risk-based' capital ratios" (see Rivlin (1996, pp. 5-6) in its 1995 annual report "for the first time gave details about its hidden reserves...". In doing so, "Dresdner officials said the bank isn't switching to international standards, but has instead decided to disclose a comparable amount of revealing detail using German accounting" (see Gumbel (1996, p. B10B) ).
For an excellent discussion of all these issues, Determining the most appropriate scheme for each and every country is a continuous an d ongoing topic of debate and research.
VI. Additional Issues to Consider
See, for example, Bank for International Settlements (1996a) and (1996b) for, respectively, studies on 50 the security aspects of electronic money and implications of electronic money for central banks; and United States Department of the Treasury (1996) for a primer on the possible policy implications of the emergence of electronic money and banking, including consumer protection, law enforcement, bank supervisory issues.
For more information and discussion of this general topic, see Humphrey, Pulley and Vesala (1995) .
The information from the international comparisons provides a fairly broad perspective on banking issues that are currently being examined and debated in many countries .
Nevertheless, additional issues remain to be considered in future work. Two issues in particular are worth noting here: the emergence of electronic banking, and the ongoing globalization o f banking.
There is currently substantial interest in the opportunities and challenges presented t o banks and their regulators by a growing use of electronic payment media. A wide spectrum of 50 issues emerges, ranging from questions about the appropriate definition of money for monetary policy purposes to concerns about the potential for fraud and mo ney laundering. Even narrowing the inquiries down to the effect of electronic banking on bank performan ce is a challenge, but one can certainly suggest a few possibilities. Using Table 14 as a guide, it is clear that for th e industrial countries listed, there is substantial variation across countries in the extent to whic h cash versus cashless payments are used, as wel l as significant differences in the public's reliance on relatively simple technology like ATMs. Such factors are important because they indicate 51 that banks differ in the degree to which they currently rely on relatively costly cash, check and other paper-based services, versus less expensive payment media such as ATMs and electronic funds transfer point-of-sale (EFTPOS) terminals. In addition, as Figure 1 illustrates, there i s currently a vastly different potential across the EU and G-10 countries for involvement i n It becomes even more complicated than simply taking into account the laws and regulations in both 52 the country in which a bank conducts its domestic business and the other countries in which its foreign business is conducted. The reason is that U.S. banks, for example, are subject to U.S. laws and regulations when engaging in activities outside the U.S., in addition to U.S. laws and regulations governing their domestic activities and foreign laws and regulations governing their foreign activities. In this regard, "under the applicable regulation implementing these statutes -known as Regulation Kthe Federal Reserve Board" . . . "does . . . provide U.S. banks the opportunity to perform activities abroad they are precluded from engaging in at home, in an effort to give them a more level playing field vis-a-vis foreign firms. However, it is important to note that the extent of some of their activities in foreign markets remains substantially more circumscribed than that of their competitors, and the organizational structures through which they must operate create certain costs" (see Task Force on the International Competitiveness of U. S. Financial Institutions (1991, pp. 124-125) A second major development infl uencing bank performance is the ongoing globalization of banking. The exploratory empirical analysis presented in Appendix 1 takes into account not only bank-specific variables, but macroeconomic, r egulatory, supervisory, and deposit-insurance variables as well. Yet, the analysis incorporates thes e additional influences on a "home-country" basis only only the regulatory environment of the country in which a bank is chartered o r licensed is directly considered. But if a significant portion of a given bank's portfolio is booked or net income is derived from activities in other countries, one would expect the regulator y environment in those countries also to influence the bank's performance. the fact that large banks in particular may be affected by the "foreign country" environment .
Using six large U.S. multinational banks as examples, th e table shows that as much as 51 percent of these banks' assets are booked abroad, and a substantial portion of net income is als o generated by overseas operations. While cross-border macroeconomic, regulatory, supervisory,
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Tables 16 and 17 provide more general information on the extent to which both U.S. banks operate 54 abroad and foreign banks operate in the U.S., respectively.
These are at least three additional issues to consider in future work on bank performance that merit 55 mention here. First, one should distinguish between public or state-owned banks, which benefit from special privileges and have their own unique incentive structure, and privately owned institutions. Second, one should take into account the fact that tax rates on banking institutions vary across countries. And third, one should allow for differences in the corporate organizational form of firms providing banking products and services. 
VII. Summary and Conclusions
This paper provides detailed information on banking structure, permissible bankin g activities, regulatory structure, deposit insurance schemes, and supervisory practices in each of the 15 European Union countries, as well as in Canada, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States.
Comparisons across the countries show that there is a wide range of banking structures an d supervisory practices, and there is a roughly equal division between those countries that rely on the central bank to be the principal bank supervisor and those that do not. In addition, although all of the countries currently have deposit insurance schemes, these schemes differ widely i n many respects. Cross-country comparisons of the different aspects of banking reveal on e common dimension, however. Almost all of the countries allow a wide range of bankin g activities, including underwriting, dealing, and brokering in securities and insurance, and those activities can generally be conducted directly in a bank or indirectly through a subsidiary of a bank, rather than through a holding company structure. The notable exceptions to this common
In the case of Japan, moreover, "The U.S. occupation authorities revamped the Japanese banking 56 system in the 1945-50 period, and since it was the conventional American wisdom of the time, the authorities instituted a Glass-Steagall type of statute. So until recently, the banking and securities businesses went their separate ways..." (See Asher (1995, p. 43) ).
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tendency are the United States and Japan. Indeed, the U.S. and Japan are the most restrictive of all the countries in providing banks with the opportunity to engage, if they so choose, in a broad range of activities demanded in the world's financial marketplace. Despite cross-country 56 differences in the range of permissible banking activities, moreover, many of the EU and G-10 countries have experienced simil ar banking problems in recent years. However, these problems have generally resulted from losses associated with declining values in commercial real estat e loans, not securities and insurance activities.
An exploratory analysis presented in Appendix 1 suggests that empirical examinations of bank performance might be enriched by taking into account a broader range of variables , including permissible banking powers. Additional research is needed to establish more firmly the exact effect of various laws and regulations on bank beh avior and performance. International comparisons and analyses that take explicit account of the regulatory regime under which banks operate should be a part of this additional research. Such research should be an important input into policy debates over whether and how to reform existing bank ing systems in countries around the world.
